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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 56Abstract
I build a quantitative two-country DSGE model of the European Union (EU) and
investigate whether there are welfare gains from ﬁscal policy cooperation between the
new EU members and the euro area (EMU). Fiscal cooperation is deﬁn e di nt e r m so f
joint maximization of the weighted average of households’ welfare. I ﬁnd that ﬁscal
policy cooperation is welfare-reducing for both groups of countries. This result depends
on a realistic assumption about the presence of foreign ownership of ﬁrms in the new EU
countries. When there is no foreign ownership in the new EU countries, the euro area
is indiﬀerent between cooperating and not cooperating, but the new EU members still
prefer not to cooperate with EMU in terms of ﬁscal policy.
Keywords: Fiscal policy cooperation; Foreign ownership of ﬁrms; Fiscal-monetary
interactions; Enlarged European Union; Central and eastern European countries
JEL classiﬁcation: E63; F42
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In 1999 most of the incumbent European Union (EU) countries renounced their sovereign
monetary policy in favor of a single, supranational monetary policy and created the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In May 2004, 10 central and eastern European
c o u n t r i e s( C E E C s ) ,p l u sM a l t aa n dC y p r u sj o i n e dt h eE Ua n dc o m m i t t e dt h e m s e l v e st o
entering EMU. A precondition for this is that they have to meet various convergence criteria,
one of which is successful participation for 2 years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2).
This means that for those CEECs which have already joined the ERM2, national monetary
policy can no longer be freely used, particularly in terms of stabilizing the economy. As a
result, the importance of ﬁscal policies as a means of stabilization could well have increased.
In light of the potentially higher importance of ﬁscal policy in CEECs with an exchange
rate peg versus the euro, this paper examines the welfare implications of ﬁscal policy coop-
e r a t i o ni nat w o - c o u n t r ym o d e lw i t haﬁxed exchange rate regime. The model incorporates
several realistic assumptions about the structure of the two economies and performs well in
terms of matching the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables. In particular, the assump-
tion about the ownership structure of ﬁrms plays a vital role.
The large (foreign) economy in the model represents EMU and the smaller (home) country
represents the new EU members. Each country has a ﬁscal and a monetary authority. The
h o m ec e n t r a lb a n ks u p p o r t saﬁxed exchange rate. The other three policymakers conduct
a stabilization policy by using policy rules which I assume that they can commit to. Each
government uses government consumption as a ﬁscal instrument and adjusts the instrument
in response to its GDP movements. I also assume that the government budgets are balanced
in each period. The foreign central bank follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule. When the
governments cooperate on ﬁscal policies, each government chooses the response parameter
to its GDP to maximize the unconditional expectation of a weighted average of home and
foreign households’ utility (welfare), taking the behavior of the foreign central bank as given.
The foreign central bank chooses its response parameters to inﬂation and GDP to maximize
5
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governments as given. In a non-cooperative game, each player takes the actions of the other
two players as given and chooses response parameter(s) in its rule to maximize the welfare
of its own households. All players act simultaneously.
To understand how the foreign ownership of ﬁrms aﬀects the results, I ﬁrst analyze a
benchmark model with no foreign ownership. When the governments cooperate on their ﬁscal
policies, they choose the response parameters to GDP to maximize a weighted average of
home and foreign welfare with the relative sizes of the economies as weights. The government
of the large economy is indiﬀerent between cooperating and not cooperating on ﬁscal policy
with the government of the smaller economy. On the other hand, the government of the
smaller country prefers not to cooperate because under ﬁscal cooperation, each government
chooses the parameter in its ﬁscal rule to stabilize shocks mainly in the large country.
Fiscal cooperation is even less desirable in the empirically more realistic model where
foreign households own some of the home ﬁrms. In this case, home households no longer
receive the state-contingent dividend income, so their ability to insure themselves is reduced.
Most of the variables in the smaller country become more volatile (e.g. private consumption,
GDP). Therefore, both governments are more active than in the benchmark model in stabi-
lizing the smaller economy when they cooperate, which makes government purchases in both
countries more volatile. More aggressive ﬁscal policies have adverse eﬀects on private non-
tradable consumption in both countries. There is also a shift towards stabilizing the shocks
that aﬀect both countries when their governments cooperate. This means that the foreign
non-tradable technology shock is not absorbed as eﬃciently and introduces more volatility
into foreign tradable consumption. As a consequence, foreign overall private consumption is
also more volatile, and welfare in the large economy is reduced. In the small country, less
volatile prices translate into less volatile tradable private consumption, so that the overall
private consumption is slightly less volatile when the governments cooperate. However, more
volatility in the labor supply and government purchases dominate, and home welfare is also
6
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policies on private consumption, but its actions are not suﬃcient to make ﬁscal policy coop-
eration desirable. These results reﬂect the fact that the monetary policy in the small country
is taken as given (by supporting a ﬁxed exchange rate), and that the monetary policy of the
large economy is not set cooperatively with respect to ﬁscal policy.
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In 1999 most of the incumbent European Union (EU) countries renounced their sovereign
monetary policy in favor of a single, supranational monetary policy and created the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In May 2004, 10 central and eastern European
c o u n t r i e s( C E E C s ) ,p l u sM a l t aa n dC y p r u sj o i n e dt h eE Ua n dc o m m i t t e dt h e m s e l v e st o
entering EMU.1 A precondition for this is that they have to meet various convergence criteria,
one of which is successful participation for 2 years in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2).
This means that for those CEECs which have already joined the ERM2, national monetary
policy can no longer be freely used, particularly in terms of stabilizing the economy. As a
result, the importance of ﬁscal policies as a means of stabilization could well have increased.
In light of the potentially higher importance of ﬁscal policy in CEECs with an exchange
rate peg versus the euro, this paper examines the welfare implications of ﬁscal policy coop-
eration in a two-country model with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
The contribution of my paper is threefold. First, I provide an explanation about the
desirability of ﬁscal cooperation by developing a quantitative business cycle model which
matches the dynamics of CEECs and the euro area, and using this model to analyze ﬁscal
and monetary policy in the EU. Second, I incorporate a realistic assumption about the
presence of foreign ownership which is a central feature in CEECs. These countries rely
heavily on foreign (mainly European) capital to ﬁnance the catching-up process with the
incumbent EU members. As a consequence, the presence of foreign ownership in the new
EU countries is substantial. For example, the foreign share in equity capitalization ranged
from 20% to 80% in many CEECs during the period 1997-2003, while the share of CEECs
in equity capitalization in the incumbent EU members is negligible.2T h ei n t r o d u c t i o no ft h i s
characteristic is appealing, as conclusions about the desirability of ﬁscal policy cooperation
depend on it. Previous studies of CEECs did not include this feature. Third, the importance
1In what follows, I concentrate on CEECs as the new EU members. For simplicity, I do not diﬀerentiate
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focused on their monetary issues during the transition period to the EU, but not their ﬁscal
policy.
In building the model, I follow Laxton and Pesenti (2003), Natalucci and Ravenna (2003),
Devereux (2002), Devereux et al. (2004), Ghironi and Rebucci (2001), and Gal´ ı and Mona-
celli (2005), all of which are examples of two-country models where one country is large
and the other one is much smaller. The structure of my model resembles these models, but
includes some new elements that are necessary (ﬁscal policy) and appealing (foreign own-
ership) when studying the need for ﬁs c a lc o o p e r a t i o ni nt h eE U .I nm ym o d e l ,t h el a r g e
(foreign) economy represents EMU and the smaller (home) country represents the new EU
members. Each country has a ﬁscal and a monetary authority. The home central bank
supports a ﬁxed exchange rate.3 The other three policymakers conduct a stabilization pol-
icy by using policy rules which I assume that they can commit to. Each government uses
government consumption as a ﬁscal instrument and adjusts the instrument in response to its
GDP movements. I also assume that the government budgets are balanced in each period.4
The foreign central bank follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule. When the governments
cooperate on ﬁscal policies, each government chooses the response parameter to its GDP to
maximize the unconditional expectation of a weighted average of home and foreign house-
holds’ utility (welfare), taking the behavior of the foreign central bank as given. The foreign
central bank chooses its response parameters to inﬂation and GDP to maximize the uncon-
ditional expectation of foreign households’ welfare, taking the behavior of the governments
as given. In a non-cooperative game, each player takes the actions of the other two players
as given and chooses response parameter(s) in its rule to maximize the welfare of its own
households. All players act simultaneously.5
3Therefore, there are only three active players involved in the strategic games.
4Technically, this is done via lump-sum taxes. Given balanced budgets each period, ﬁscal sustainability is
ensured, and I do not discuss ﬁscal cooperation in the form of common rules to ensure ﬁscal discipline.
5The model is solved numerically and calibrated to the euro area (large economy) and the Czech Republic
(small economy). One must acknowledge that the new EU members are heterogenous in their structure.
However, given limited time series for many of the new EU members, I follow several authors who have used
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benchmark model with no foreign ownership. When the governments cooperate on their ﬁscal
policies, they choose the response parameters to GDP to maximize a weighted average of
home and foreign welfare with the relative sizes of the economies as weights. The government
of the large economy is indiﬀerent between cooperating and not cooperating on ﬁscal policy
with the government of the smaller economy. On the other hand, the government of the
smaller country prefers not to cooperate because under ﬁscal cooperation, each government
chooses the parameter in its ﬁscal rule to stabilize shocks mainly in the large country.
Fiscal cooperation is even less desirable in the empirically more realistic model where
foreign households own home ﬁrms. In this case, home households no longer receive the
state-contingent dividend income, so their ability to insure themselves is reduced. Most of
the variables in the smaller country become more volatile (e.g. private consumption, GDP).
Therefore, both governments are more active than in the benchmark model in stabilizing the
smaller economy when they cooperate, which makes government purchases in both countries
more volatile. More aggressive ﬁscal policies have adverse eﬀects on private non-tradable
consumption in both countries.6 There is also a shift towards stabilizing the shocks that
aﬀect both countries when their governments cooperate. This means that the foreign non-
tradable technology shock is not absorbed as eﬃciently and introduces more volatility into
foreign tradable consumption. As a consequence, foreign overall private consumption is
also more volatile, and welfare in the large economy is reduced. In the small country, less
volatile prices translate into less volatile tradable private consumption, so that the overall
private consumption is slightly less volatile when the governments cooperate. However, more
volatility in the labor supply and government purchases dominate, and home welfare is also
lower under ﬁscal cooperation. The foreign central bank cushions the negative eﬀect of
ﬁscal policies on private consumption, but its actions are not suﬃcient to make ﬁscal policy
cooperation desirable. These results reﬂect the fact that the monetary policy in the small
the data for the Czech Republic to proxy for the new EU countries.
6The government purchases non-tradable goods.
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policy of the large economy is not set cooperatively with respect to ﬁscal policy.
It is worth mentioning that the ﬁscal side (and the monetary side) of the model is rather
simple and therefore the ﬁscal experiment is a rather speciﬁc one. With such a complex
model, it is impossible to solve a ﬁrst-best problem. Instead, I use ad hoc ﬁscal and monetary
policy rules motivated by the data and solve for this problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the related
literature on monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions. Section 3 outlines a two-country model
of the EU. In Section 4 I describe the solution method and the selection of parameters. In
Section 5 I present the transmission mechanism and the dynamic properties of the model. I
explain the results about ﬁscal cooperation is Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
My work relates to a vast literature on monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions and the
literature on optimal taxation, which provide insights on whether there are gains from policy
cooperation or not. Within a more recent literature, there are several studies in which
the gains from cooperation depend on the policymakers’ inability to commit. Examples
include Rogoﬀ (1985), Kehoe (1989), Canzoneri, Henderson (1991), and Jensen (1996). If
policymakers could commit in their models, cooperation would be beneﬁcial. By contrast, if
they could not commit, there would be no gains from cooperation.
Another branch of the literature shows that policy cooperation is counterproductive if it
is limited to a subset of players. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma et al. (2001)a n d
Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) consider a monetary union and decentralized ﬁscal policies,
and show how the adverse reaction of a common central bank to ﬁscal cooperation can reduce
welfare for some or all of the players. However, cooperation is the preferred outcome if it is
extended to all players.
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ﬁscal cooperation depend on the policymakers’ agreement on goals. They show that there
is no need for ﬁscal cooperation in a monetary union when all players agree on their goals.
In this case, they can reach the optimal outcome. However, this diﬀe r si nC h a r ia n dK e h o e
(2004), who show that the cooperative and the non-cooperative equilibria may not be the
same under the same objectives.
Some contribution ﬁnd that gains from ﬁscal policy cooperation depend on the monetary
regime. For example, Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) conclude that ﬁscal cooperation
may be welfare-reducing if monetary policies are set non-cooperatively. As regards the
quantiﬁcation of gains from ﬁscal cooperation, Mendoza and Tesar (2005) ﬁnd that they are
very small.
Finally, my model is similar to Quadrini (forthcoming) in the sense that capital market
liberalization plays a role in the desirability of ﬁscal cooperation. In his model, the equilib-
rium with tax cooperation reproduces the outcome of the model without capital mobility,
which is welfare-inferior to the case of capital market liberalization. His results crucially
depend on the governments’ inability to commit to future policies; by contrast, I assume
that policymakers can commit.
3 A general equilibrium model of the European Union
3.1 The overview of the economic environment
To mimic the structure of the enlarged EU and in particular the nature of the newly admitted
members, I take into account four key features of these countries.7 The ﬁrst is the high level
of foreign ownership of ﬁrms, since central and eastern European countries rely heavily on
foreign (mainly European) capital to ﬁnance the catching-up process with the rest of the EU.
7Many and even more of the countries’ characteristics that I use in my model are incorporated into the
models of accession countries mentioned in the Introduction.
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represent a substantial part of these countries’ imports. For example, intermediate goods
account for 60% of all Slovene imports and above 50% of Czech and Hungarian imports, mak-
ing them very exposed to external shocks.8 Third, domestic tradable goods are exported and
consumed by domestic households. Fourth, the non-tradable sector is important, and most
government purchases are of non-tradable goods. Taking all of the above into consideration
provides more ﬂexibility in matching the data and more realistic interdependencies between
the central and eastern European countries and the euro area.
The theoretical framework that I use for my analysis is a micro-founded dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model. The foreign country in the model is designated to ﬁtE M Ua n d
the home country represents an aggregate of the new EU members. In each country, there
are households, ﬁrms, a ﬁscal authority (government) and a monetary authority (central
bank). Foreign variables are indexed by a star.
Households in both countries are inﬁnitely lived and have preferences regarding consump-
tion, real money balances, the labor supply, and government purchases. Each household
consumes domestic ﬁnal non-tradable goods, domestic ﬁnal tradable goods and imported
ﬁnal tradable goods. Each household supplies homogenous labor to domestic ﬁrms produc-
ing ﬁnal non-tradable goods and to domestic ﬁrms producing intermediate tradable goods.
Labor is perfectly mobile between sectors within a country. The labor market is perfectly
competitive, and labor is immobile internationally. Households trade short-term nominal
bonds. There are two bonds, home and foreign, denominated in home and foreign currency,
respectively. Only the foreign-denominated bond is traded internationally.
The ownership structure of the ﬁrms and the equity share trade is as follows: in all cases,
all but intermediate sector ﬁrms are locally-owned, i.e. home households own home ﬁrms
and foreign households own foreign ﬁrms. Since the presence of foreign ownership in the new
EU countries is substantial, I assume that owners of home and foreign intermediate ﬁrms are
8McCallum and Nelson (2000) show that intermediate goods as imports improve model dynamics.
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home and foreign intermediate sector ﬁrms.9
Each country produces three types of goods: ﬁnal non-tradable goods, ﬁnal tradable
goods and a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate tradable goods. The ﬁnal non-tradable
goods are produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms using domestic labor as input and can
be consumed by households and by the government. The ﬁrms which produce the ﬁnal
tradable goods operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Their goods are produced
by combining domestic and imported intermediate goods and are used for private consump-
tion. Each intermediate tradable good is produced by a single ﬁrm in a monopolistically
competitive environment. The input used in the production of each intermediate good is
domestic labor. The intermediate goods are used in the production of ﬁnal tradable goods.
In the intermediate sector, there are nominal rigidities in the form of a quadratic cost of
price adjustment.
Finally, government conducts a ﬁscal policy of stabilization. The government spends
its revenue on ﬁnal non-tradable goods and this is ﬁnanced through taxes and seigniorage.
The central bank in each country is instrument-independent of the government. The foreign
central bank conducts monetary policy by employing an interest rate rule, while the home
central bank supports a ﬁxed exchange rate.
9The sector that is exclusively foreign-owned is only one of three sectors. This assumption is thus not
extreme with regard to the extent of foreign presence.
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where the labor supply equals Lt = LN,t+LX,t, and labor is homogenous and perfectly mobile
between sectors within the country, Ct is the consumption basket, Pt is the consumption
price index, Mt are nominal money balances, and Gt are government purchases. σ>0,
σg > 0, χ ≥ 0, φ>0, ψ>0. β is the discount factor, 1
σ is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of private consumption, 1
φ is the elasticity of substitution of real money balances,
and 1
ψ is the labor supply elasticity. AC,t is a preference shock and AL,t is a shock to
labor disutility. Home consumers are indexed by j ∈ [0,a)a n da is the relative size of the
home country. Foreign households’ utility function is similar to the home one, and foreign
households are indexed by j∗ ∈ [a,1].
3.2.2 The intra-temporal allocation of consumption
Total consumption, C
j






























where 0 ≤ ϕt ≤ 1 is the share of tradable consumption in the consumption basket and µ>0
is the elasticity of substitution between non-tradable and tradable consumption. The (log of)
tradable goods’ weight in consumption, ϕt, is subject to an autocorrelated disturbance term
around the steady-state mean. This shock represents shifts in home residents’ preferences
from non-tradable to tradable goods. C
j
N is a basket of ﬁnal non-tradable goods produced
by perfectly competitive ﬁrms.
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3.2 Households and their trading opportunities
3.2.1 Utility function

























where 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 is the share of home tradable consumption and η>0 is the elasticity of




F∗ are the baskets of home
and foreign ﬁnal tradable goods also produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms.















where PN and PT are the prices of non-tradable and tradable consumption baskets, respec-
tively, and PF and PF∗ are the prices of home and foreign baskets of ﬁnal tradable goods,
respectively.
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3.2.3 Inter-temporal optimization
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The home household j consumes, C
j
t, pays net lump-sum taxes, T
j
t ,a n dr e c e i v e st h ew a g e











. The home household
j holds domestic money, M
j
t , and home and foreign bonds, B and B∗, denominated in the
home and foreign currency, respectively, where B
j
t+1 is the stock of home bonds held by
household j entering period t + 1 and B
∗,j
t+1 is the stock of foreign bonds held by household
j entering period t + 1. εt is the nominal exchange rate in the units of home currency per
one unit of foreign currency. The short-term nominal interest rates it and i∗
t are paid at
the beginning of period t a n da r ek n o w na tt i m et − 1. Only the foreign bonds are traded
internationally. There are intermediation costs for households entering the international
bond market.10 In particular, households face a convex cost of holding foreign bonds in
quantities that diﬀer from the steady-state level. The revenue from intermediation is rebated
to households as a lump-sum transaction cost transfer, TCT
j















Each household chooses the labor supply, bond and money holdings, and consumption
path to maximize the expected lifetime utility (1), subject to the budget constraint (8). The
10The intermediation costs are introduced to guarantee that the net bond positions follow a stationary
process and economies converge asymptotically to a steady state. See Schmitt-Groh´ ea n dU r i b e( 2 0 0 3 )o n
this and other approaches on how to pin down the steday-state values of bonds.
11I assume that intermediaries are perfectly competitive and owned by domestic households.
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Pt and wX,t ≡
WX,t
Pt are real wages in the ﬁnal non-tradable sector and
























































This ﬁrst-order condition accounts for a reduced return on lending to foreigners and an
increased cost of borrowing from foreigners due to intermediation costs.
Unlike home households, foreign households trade only foreign bonds; however, in addi-
tion to foreign bonds, they also trade equity shares in home and foreign intermediate sector
ﬁrms. Their budget constraint is presented in the appendix. The ﬁrst-order conditions with



































































where V x and V x∗
denote the price of the equity shares in the home intermediate ﬁrm x and
the price of the equity shares in the foreign intermediate ﬁrm x∗, respectively. Dx and Dx∗
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are the dividends paid by the home and foreign ﬁrms x and x∗, respectively.3.2.4 Asset market clearing
In equilibrium, households and ﬁrms are symmetric so that B
j























∗ are the foreign household j∗0s equity share holdings in home ﬁrm x and S
x∗,j∗
∗ are j∗0s












∗,t+1dj ∗ =0 . (15)














3.3 The intermediate goods sector and its ownership structure
T h eh o m ei n t e r m e d i a t eg o o dx ∈ [0,a) is produced by a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm




12See the appendix for the explanation of notation.
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X,t is homogenous labor
used in the production of good x. Firms producing intermediate goods face nominal rigidities.
Following Rotemberg (1982), these are expressed in the form of a quadratic cost of price
adjustment.







































X,s = Y Dx
X,s = Y x
X,s. (21)
Since foreign households own home intermediate sector ﬁrms, the discount factor for the
home ﬁrm x is Ωx










for s = t,t + 1,t+2 ... and τ is the tax rate on the
ﬁrm’s revenues.






which implies that the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (21), λx
t, is equal to the real marginal
cost. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the price implies a price which is set as a




where the markup equals
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In symmetric equilibrium, pt(x)=PX,t.F o r e i g n ﬁrms solve a similar problem and the
law of one price holds: PX,t = εtP∗
X,t, PX∗,t = εtP∗
X∗,t.
3.4 Production of ﬁnal goods
3.4.1 Production of ﬁnal non-tradable goods
There is a continuum of symmetric perfectly competitive home ﬁrms on the interval n ∈ [0,a)
producing the home ﬁnal non-tradable good N. The output of a representative ﬁrm at time
t is denoted by YN,t and is generated using the following linear technology:
YN,t ≡ AN,tLN,t, (24)
where AN,t is a productivity shock common to the producers of the home non-tradable good
and LN,t is homogenous labor used in the production of the home non-tradable good. Taking
the price of labor, WN,a sg i v e n ,t h eﬁrm chooses labor, LN,t, to minimize its costs subject
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WN,t
Pt is the real wage in the non-tradable sector and RPN,t ≡
PN,t
Pt is the price
of good N in the units of the consumption basket. The same optimization problem applies
to foreign ﬁrms.
3.4.2 Production of ﬁnal tradable goods
There is a continuum of symmetric, perfectly competitive home ﬁrms on the interval f ∈ [0,a)















 −1 , (26)
where YF,t is the amount of the home ﬁnal tradable good produced by a representative ﬁrm
at time t. The home ﬁnal tradable good F is produced using two intermediate goods: a
basket X of home tradable diﬀerentiated intermediate goods, and a basket X∗ of foreign
tradable diﬀerentiated intermediate goods.  >0 is the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign intermediate goods, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is the share of home intermediate goods
i nt h ep r o d u c t i o no ft h eh o m eﬁnal tradable good.





























where θ>1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among the intermediate goods and x



































where PX and PX∗ are the price indices of the home and foreign baskets of intermediate
goods and pt(x)a n dpt(x∗) are the prices of the varieties x and x∗.

































Foreign producers solve a similar problem. The law of one price holds in the ﬁnal tradable
sector: PF,t = εtP∗
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The market clearing conditions are as follows. Non-tradable goods can be consumed by






CN,tdj + aGt. (33)











and intermediate goods are used in the production of home and foreign ﬁnal tradable goods.






















Similar market clearing conditions hold for foreign goods and labor.
3.6 Fiscal and monetary policy
3.6.1 Government and ﬁscal policy
The government is assumed not to be productive and public spending is directed towards
ﬁnal non-tradable goods and is denoted by G, which is per capita government consumption.
The government ﬁnances its consumption through lump-sum taxes imposed on consumers,
taxes imposed on the intermediate sector ﬁrms, labor income taxes, dividend income taxes,
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Tax rates are taken as given and are calibrated to the EU data. The government uses the
ratio of government consumption to GDP as its instrument and pursues a stabilization policy.











GDPt , fGDP is the feedback parameter on GDP gap with respect to the steady
state, and  
fp
t is an exogenous shock to ﬁscal policy. This ﬁscal rule reﬂects an output gap
stabilization motive and is motivated by the empirical literature.15 Foreign ﬁscal policy is
speciﬁed in a similar way.
3.6.2 Central bank and monetary policy
The home central bank issues home nominal money. The monetary policy in the home econ-
omy supports a ﬁxed exchange rate,16 which is in line with the requirements of membership
in the ERM2 prior to joining the monetary union.
The foreign central bank issues foreign nominal money. The foreign monetary policy is
endogenous and speciﬁed in terms of an interest rate rule:
1 + i∗
t+1 =( 1 + i∗
t)
m∗














13The government’s budget constraint is in the appendix.
14Beetsma and Jensen (2002) show that this class of ﬁscal rules performs well relative to the optimal rules
in their model.
15Empirical ﬁscal rules also take into account the public deﬁcit stabilization motive. See for example Gal´ ı
and Perotti (2003), who estimate ﬁscal rules for EMU/OECD countries, and Favero and Monacelli (2003) for
the US and references therein.
Gali and Perotti (2003) ﬁnd empirical evidence that ﬁscal policies became increasingly countercyclical in
EMU in the period 1980-2001, and that spending policies played a more important role as a countercyclical
tool than revenue policies, while the Government of Slovenia, for example, announced it would use its ﬁscal
policy for stabilization purposes after ﬁx i n gt h ee x c h a n g er a t et ot h ee u r oi ns u m m e r2 0 0 4 .
16See Benigno et al. (2002) for details on how to ﬁx the exchange rate.
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GDP are the feedback parameters on the previous period interest
rate, CPI inﬂation and GDP gap, respectively, and  
∗mp
t is an exogenous shock to monetary
policy.
4 Solution and parameterization of the model
4.1 Solution of the model and the steady state
The variables are expressed in real aggregate per capita terms. As the model cannot be solved
analytically, I therefore calculate the rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linearized
approximation around the steady state. I employ the solution method for solving nonlinear
dynamic discrete-time stochastic models provided by Uhlig (1999), and ﬁnd the recursive
equilibrium law of motion using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients. The steady state
for the benchmark model with no foreign ownership can be solved analytically, but I use
numeric methods to solve for the steady state of the model with the foreign ownership of
home intermediate ﬁrms.
4.2 Parameterization
The home economy in this model represents the new EU members, and the foreign economy is
designated to be EMU.17 Thus, the size of the home country relative to the foreign economy,
a, is set to 5 percent.18 The discount factor, β, equals 0.99, which implies an annual real
interest rate of around 4 percent. In line with the literature, the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution of consumption, σ, is equal to 2. Following Laxton and Pesenti
(2003), the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, ψ, is set to 2.5. I assume the utility of
government consumption is logarithmic so that σg = 1.
17The model is calibrated to the EMU and the Czech Republic’s data.
18The new members’ share of GDP in the EU’s total GDP is around 5 percent.
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share of home intermediate goods in the production of ﬁnal tradable goods, γ,a r ee q u a lt o
a. The share of tradable consumption in the consumption basket, ϕ, equals 55 percent as in
Natalucci and Ravenna (2003).
The elasticity of substitution between non-tradable and tradable consumption, µ,i ss e t
t o0 . 5a si nS t o c k m a na n dT e s a r( 1995) and the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign tradable goods, η,i ss e tt o1.5.   is the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign intermediate goods and is set to 0.5. The last two parameters are taken
from Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). θ denotes the elasticity of substitution among the
intermediate goods. I set θ = 11 which, together with the revenue tax of 0.2, implies a
markup of 1.375.19 The price adjustment cost parameter, κ,i ss e tt o7 7 ,a se s t i m a t e db y
Ireland (2001)f o rt h eU Se c o n o m y .A l lﬁnancial transaction cost parameters are set to 0.01,
w h i c hi ss t a n d a r di nt h el i t e r a t u r e . 20
I treat tax rates as parameters and take their values from Quadrini (forthcoming) and
Mendoza and Tesar (2005). The tax rate on revenue, τ, equals 20 percent. The tax rate
on labor income is set to 37 percent, and the tax rate on dividends to 25 percent. The
steady-state share of government purchases in GDP is calibrated to 18 percent.
The foreign monetary policy parameters are set as estimated by Smets and Wouters
(2003). The degree of interest rate smoothing, m∗
i, is set to 0.95. The interest rate response
to inﬂation, m∗
CPI, equals 1.65, and the interest rate response to GDP, m∗
GDP,i ss e tt o0 . 14.
I assume that the home central bank supports a ﬁxed exchange rate, which is in line with
ERM2, and keep this assumption across all model speciﬁcations.21 Gal´ ı and Perotti (2003)
19Martins et al. (1996) estimate the average markup for the manufacturing sector at 1.2 for the OECD
countries. Some authors suggest that the range between 1.2 and 1.7 is reasonable. See Morrison (1994) and
Domowitz et al. (1988).
20Ghironi et al. (2003) set these parameters to 0.025 to match reasonable persistence of the net foreign
assets.
21Some of the new EU members have already ﬁxed their exchange rate to the euro in order to satisfy the
exchange rate criterion to enter the monetary union. However, past policies in most of these countries did
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period after the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty indicates that the primary spending-
to-potential output ratio reacts to the output gap with the coeﬃcient of 0.04 and that there
is a high persistence of the ﬁscal instrument; the persistence parameter is estimated to be
0.8. I approximate the historic foreign ﬁscal policy by setting the reaction coeﬃcient to the
output gap to zero, and I incorporate a high persistence coeﬃcient on the past instrument
with an AR(1) ﬁscal shock. There are no empirical studies on ﬁscal policy rules for the
new EU members. Without loss of generality, I assume that also the new EU members
have not been using their ﬁscal policies as a stabilization tool until recently. Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003) and Devereux (2002) estimate government spending for the Czech Republic
and Estonia as AR(1) processes with the persistence parameters of 0.7 and 0.8, respectively.
5T h e e ﬀects and transmission of shocks and dynamic prop-
erties of the model
To understand how the model’s transmission mechanism works, I ﬁrst analyze the impulse
responses of the macroeconomic variables to a technology shock. I also investigate the eﬀects
of a ﬁscal shock in order to show how ﬁscal policy actions in one country aﬀect variables in
the other economy. This analysis is conducted for historic monetary and ﬁscal policies.
5.1 Foreign technology shock
I choose to analyze the impulse responses of variables in both economies to a foreign tech-
nology (and later ﬁscal) shock because the home country only marginally aﬀects the large
economy and most of the spillovers ﬂow from the large to the small country.
Figures 1 and 2 present the impulse responses to a 1-percent increase in the foreign
intermediate sector productivity. To understand the implications of the assumption about
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for a benchmark model without foreign ownership (solid line), as well as the model in which
t h eh o m ei n t e r m e d i a t es e c t o rﬁrms are exclusively foreign-owned (dashed line).
A positive productivity shock in the foreign intermediate sector increases the output of
foreign intermediate goods, reduces the labor supply, and increases the wage rate in this
sector. The increase in productivity dominates the eﬀect of higher wages so that marginal
costs decrease. As a consequence, the relative price of foreign intermediate goods falls. The
markup increases in order to preserve proﬁtability, and the dividends are higher. This is
reﬂe c t e di na ni n c r e a s eo ft h ef o r e i g ns h a r ep r i c e .
The productivity shock in the foreign intermediate sector transmits to other sectors in
the foreign economy as well as to the home economy. The shock is directly transmitted
to foreign ﬁrms which produce ﬁnal tradable goods and use intermediate goods in their
production. They enjoy lower foreign input prices and therefore expand the production of
the ﬁnal tradable goods. The relative price of the foreign ﬁnal tradable goods decreases, while
the quantity demanded by home and foreign households increases. Foreign households also
demand more non-tradable goods, which increases labor demand and wages in the foreign
non-tradable sector. The foreign relative price of the non-tradable goods is consequently
higher.
At the same time, the original shock transmits into the home economy. The home ﬁnal
tradable sector expands for the same reason as the foreign ﬁnal tradable sector (foreign inputs
have a higher weight in the production of ﬁnal tradable goods), while the home relative price
of the ﬁnal tradable goods decreases. There is an initial boom in the home intermediate
sector coming from higher home and foreign demand because both, home and foreign inputs
a r er e q u i r e di nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fﬁnal tradable goods. After the initial positive eﬀect on
the home intermediate sector, the demand for home inputs decreases (prices are higher at
home). The labor dynamics at home follow output dynamics in the home intermediate
sector. Higher demand for inputs initially results in higher demand for the intermediate
29
ECB
Working Paper Series No 655
July 2006labor and higher wages. Since labor is perfectly mobile between the two sectors, it ﬂows to
the intermediate sector. Initially, home non-tradable output declines but once the positive
eﬀect in the intermediate sector is reversed, labor in the intermediate sector is lower and
the output in the non-tradable sector expands. The home relative price of the non-tradable
goods increases.
As a consequence of a positive productivity shock in the foreign intermediate sector,
home and foreign GDP and private consumption expand. Foreign CPI inﬂation almost does
not responds due to the opposite dynamics of prices of tradable and non-tradable goods,
while home CPI inﬂation increases because the prices of tradable and non-tradable goods
both increase. As a result, the real exchange rate, which is deﬁned as REt =
εtP∗
t
Pt ,d e c l i n e s
(nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed). Home households initially borrow from foreign households
but they later accumulate foreign bonds because the shock results in higher expansion in the
home country.
5.2 Foreign ﬁscal shock
Figures 3 and 4 present the impulse responses to a 1-percent increase in the foreign ﬁscal
shock. A demand shock in the form of an increase of the foreign government purchases-
to-GDP ratio increases demand for labor and output in the foreign non-tradable sector.
Government consumption crowds out private non-tradable consumption, and this cushions
the foreign wage rate and the relative price of the non-tradable goods from a large increase.
Higher wages in the non-tradable sector attract labor from the intermediate sector and thus
the wage in the intermediate sector increases as well. Consequently, the supply of foreign
intermediate goods falls and demand adjusts. Because of the opposite labor cost and markup
dynamics in the foreign intermediate sector, the relative price of the foreign inputs almost
does not change. Intermediate goods are inputs in the production of ﬁnal tradable goods,
which decreases in both countries. In the foreign economy, the relative price of the ﬁnal
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crowding-out eﬀect, which prevents foreign GDP from a signiﬁcant expansion.
The shock transmits to the home economy because the supply of foreign intermediate
goods drops and so does the production of home inputs. This reduces the supply of home
and foreign ﬁnal tradable goods. The relative price of home ﬁnal tradable goods increases.
Labor in the home country reallocates to the non-tradable sector because of lower labor
demand and wages in the intermediate sector. Higher labor supply in the non-tradable
sector increases production and reduces the wages and relative prices in this sector. Overall
home private consumption decreases because the consumption of the ﬁnal tradable goods is
lower, and almost all of the additional non-tradable goods are consumed by the government,
which crowds out private non-tradable consumption. Home GDP decreases.
Home CPI inﬂation decreases because the main components of home CPI inﬂation (the
home prices of non-tradable goods and the foreign prices of tradable goods) are lower. On
the other hand, foreign CPI does not change since all foreign prices stay almost constant.
T h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei st h u sd r i v e nb yh o m ep r i c e sa n di n c r e a s e s .
5.3 Estimates of macroeconomic variability
The previous section analyzed only the responses of variables in the two economies to a
given shock. Here I investigate how the model behaves when the two countries are hit by
all shocks at once. In order to do so, I need to make some assumptions about the stochastic
processes. The empirical evidence on the productivity shocks shows their high persistence
and positive correlation across countries.22 In my model, productivity shocks follow AR(1)
processes. I set the persistence parameters of all productivity shocks to 0.9. Productivity
shocks between diﬀerent sectors within a country are perfectly correlated as in Natalucci and
Ravenna (2003) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003). All other shocks are independent of each
other. The monetary shock in the foreign interest rate rule is and iid process. The persistence
22See for example Backus et al. (1992).
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between non-tradable and tradable goods are set to 0.7, 0.9 and 0.9, respectively. I choose
t h es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n so ft h es h o c k st om a t c hs o m eo ft h em o m e n t so fm a c r o e c o n o m i c
variables given historic economic policies and the baseline parameter values. The details on
stochastic processes are in Table 3.
The second moments of the model (with foreign ownership) and the values from the data
are presented in Table 4. The model generates almost twice as much variability in GDP in the
new EU members compared to the euro area; the absolute values of the standard deviations
of GDP are consistent with the variability in historic data. For the Czech Republic, the
m o d e lp e r f o r m sw e l li nt h es e n s et h a ta l lo ft h eG D Pc o m p o n e n t sa r em o r ev o l a t i l et h a n
GDP itself. However, exports and imports in the model are less volatile than their historic
counterparts. This may be explained by the fact that there is no capital/investment in my
model. Investment is the most volatile component of GDP and since investment goods are
not a part of exports and imports in my model, the volatility of exports and imports may
accordingly be understated. Government expenditure is more volatile in the model than
in the historic data.23 There is a trade-oﬀ between matching the volatility of government
purchases and matching the rest of the variables in this exercise.
The CPI inﬂation rate is more volatile and the interest rate is somewhat less volatile than
in the data. This could be due to the monetary regime that I assume for the smaller economy
in the model. In order to mimic the current arrangement of the institutions in the new EU
member states and to keep the strategic games among policymakers as simple as possible,
I assume that the smaller economy supports a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. However, the
historic moments are based on a monetary regime that is not a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
For the euro area, the CPI inﬂation and the interest rate are less variable in the model
because of the assumption of an inﬂation-targeting regime, which is similar to the model
23The variability of government expenditure directly enters the welfare function used in the policy exper-
iments. I thus correct for the fact that the variability of government purchases is too high by adjusting the
weight on the government purchases in the welfare function.
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ponents than that of the GDP itself for the euro area, the model generates about the same
degree of volatility for each of them.
The dynamic properties of the model can partially be compared to the model of Laxton
and Pesenti (2003) and Natalucci and Ravenna (2003). The latter’s performs better in terms
of the CPI inﬂation rate and the interest rate. Given that I assume a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime (and they do not) this is not surprising. As for the other variables, the model performs
at least as well as their model. I cannot compare the dynamics for the euro area to Natalucci
and Ravenna (2003) since they assume that the rest of the world is exogenous and do not
model the second country.
The model in Laxton and Pesenti (2003) is highly sophisticated and incorporates many
realistic ingredients which I do not include in my model. Therefore, the overall performance
of their model in matching the second moments is better. Nonetheless, both models fail to
match the dynamics of the CPI inﬂation rates and the interest rates. As explained above,
the lower volatilities of exports and imports in my model compared to the historic data may
be a consequence of the lack of investment in the model. Finally, the real exchange rate is
much better matched in my model compared to Laxton and Pesenti (2003).
5.4 The role of foreign ownership
Table 5 presents the standard deviations of selected variables for the model with foreign
ownership of ﬁrms in the home economy (Foreign) and for the model without foreign owner-
ship of home ﬁrms (Local). The volatility of most variables in the home economy is higher
in the model where foreign households own home ﬁrms, compared to the model without for-
eign ownership (higher volatility can also be inferred from some impulse responses). When
foreign households own home intermediate sector ﬁrms, home households no longer receive
state-contingent dividend income and their ability to insure themselves and smooth con-
sumption is thus reduced. Home households can only insure themselves against the risk of
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most other variables, is more volatile when foreign households own home intermediate sector
ﬁrms. On the other hand, the home labor eﬀort and imports are slightly less volatile in the
model with foreign ownership of home ﬁrms.
The comparison of the second moments of selected variables between the model with
and without foreign ownership of ﬁrms in the home economy reveals that the two models
perform similarly in matching the second moments of the data.24 The model with foreign
ownership performs better in matching the volatilities of consumption, exports and the real
exchange rate (even though both models understate the volatilities of these three variables),
while the dynamics of government expenditure, the CPI inﬂation rate and imports are better
matched in the model without foreign ownership. In both models, the volatility of govern-
ment expenditure and the CPI inﬂation rate is overstated compared to the data, while the
volatility of imports is understated. Real GDP may be better matched in the model with
foreign ownership, given that Laxton and Pesenti (2003) estimate the standard deviation of
the Czech GDP at 2 percent. The ownership structure in the home economy has negligible
eﬀects on the foreign economy.
6D e s i g n o f ﬁscal and monetary policy
So far I have assumed that ﬁscal and monetary policies are conducted by use of historic
empirical rules. Such speciﬁcation is useful because it helps us understand how shocks are
transmitted to macroeconomic variables, and provides a basis for empirical evaluation of the
underlying model.
In this section I turn to the question of ﬁscal policy cooperation, in particular whether
there are gains from ﬁscal cooperation between the new and the incumbent members of the
24One should keep in mind that the standard deviations of the shocks are chosen to match the moments
and are not estimates from the data. The estimated standard deviations of shocks may imply a diﬀerent
conclusion about the relative performance of the two models.
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the structure of the policymakers’ strategic games.
I assume that policymakers choose a stabilization policy, i.e. the reaction parameters in
their policy rules, to maximize the unconditional expectation of households’ welfare and that
they can commit to the rules. Given the class of rules considered, such ﬁscal and monetary
policies are optimal.25 I use numeric optimization to solve for optimal policies. The welfare
function is derived as a second-order Taylor approximation to the utility function, and can














where C, L,a n dG are the steady state values of consumption, labor and government pur-
chases, and the hats denote percentage deviations from the steady state.
The deﬁnitions of strategic games among the policymakers are as follows. Non-cooperative
game: Each government chooses its reaction parameter to GDP to maximize the uncondi-
tional expectation of its households’ welfare, taking the behavior of the other government
and the foreign central bank as given. The foreign central bank chooses the response pa-
rameters to inﬂation and GDP to maximize the unconditional expectation of the foreign
households’ welfare, taking the behavior of the governments as given. All parameters are
chosen simultaneously. Fiscal cooperation: The two governments act as a “single” policy-
maker and each choose its response parameter to GDP to jointly maximize the unconditional
expectation of a weighted average of home and foreign welfare, taking the behavior of the
foreign central bank as given. The weights in the joint welfare function are the relative sizes
of the countries. The foreign central bank chooses the parameters in its rule to maximize
the unconditional expectation of the foreign households’ welfare, taking the behavior of the
governments as given. All policymakers act simultaneously.
25In what follows, optimal policy refers to optimal policy within the class of rules speciﬁed in the model.
26I assume that real money balances do not matter for welfare, as is common in the literature.
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o p e r a t i o ni nt h eE U
6.1.1 The benchmark model without foreign ownership
To understand how foreign ownership of ﬁrms aﬀects ﬁscal and monetary policy and ﬁscal
cooperation, I ﬁrst analyze a benchmark case without foreign ownership. Table 1 presents the
optimal ﬁscal and monetary reaction coeﬃcients to GDP and inﬂation, plus the associated
welfare losses for the models with and without foreign ownership.27






Non-cooperation -0.925 -27.998 1.648 80.00 13.853 0.963
Cooperation -1.137 -41.606 1.363 80.011 3.972 0.970
No Foreign Ownership
Non-cooperation -0.179 -28.098 1.723 80.44 8.574 0.946
Cooperation -0.306 -28.017 1.720 80.00 8.578 0.945
Result 1 The optimal policies are countercyclical and call for a more aggressive stabilization
of the output gap than historic policies.
It is optimal for the foreign ﬁscal and monetary authorities to respond strongly to the
output gap, and this is consistent with a less aggressive home ﬁscal policy. The home country
beneﬁts from stabilization policy of the foreign country for two reasons. First, it is a small
open economy with strong trade links to the foreign country, and is thus very exposed to
anything that happens in the large economy. When foreign policymakers stabilize their
27A note on the magnitude of the optimized coeﬃc i e n t sm a yb eu s e f u l . T h eo p t i m i z e dc o e ﬃcients may
seem detached from reality. However, one should not compare them directly to the estimated ones and give
any policy prescriptions regarding the size of the coeﬃcients. A large coeﬃcient purely reﬂects the fact that
in this model it is optimal, for example, to close the output gap.
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supports a ﬁxed exchange rate and therefore ”imports” foreign monetary policy.28
It is interesting to notice that the optimal ﬁscal policy in this model is countercyclical.
This is a typical feature of DSGE models and therefore not surprising. On the contrary, the
empirical evidence suggests that the stance of ﬁscal policies has actually been procyclical or
at best acyclical in many euro area countries. However, since the Maastricht criteria were
set in place, ﬁscal policies in the euro area have become more and more countercyclical.29
Result 2 The home country is better-oﬀ in the non-cooperative equilibrium, and the foreign
economy prefers ﬁscal cooperation.
In a world with a small and a large country, one would expect that policy cooperation
may not matter for the large economy but could make sense for the small country. The
results in the benchmark model support this intuition and the large economy is more or
less indiﬀerent between cooperating and not cooperating its ﬁscal policy with the smaller
country. Moreover, the large economy almost does not change its policy when it cooperates
with the small country. The small country, on the other hand, pursues a more aggressive
ﬁscal policy when it internalizes its (small) spillovers on the large economy.30 As a result,
t h eh o m ec o u n t r yi sw o r s eo ﬀ in the cooperative equilibrium since in this equilibrium, the
focus is on maximizing foreign welfare and stabilizing shocks in the large economy.31
6.1.2 The model with foreign-owned home intermediate sector ﬁrms
I now turn to an empirically more relevant case where I assume that foreign households are
exclusive owners of the home intermediate sector ﬁrms, and I investigate the diﬀerences in
28Foreign expansionary monetary policy increases home GDP.
29See Gal´ ı and Perotti (2003).
30The change in the home ﬁscal policy’s response is small because the externalities from home to foreign
country are almost negligible.
31Both governments choose their policies mainly to maximize foreign welfare. The foreign central bank is
maximizing foreign welfare, and there is no home central bank that would maximize its households’ well-being.
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presence in the smaller country.32
Result 3 Home ﬁscal policy is more aggressive compared to the benchmark model.
M o s to ft h ev a r i a b l e si nt h eh o m ee c o n o m ya r em o r ev o l a t i l ei nt h em o d e lw i t he x c l u s i v e
foreign ownership in the home intermediate sector compared to the benchmark case.33 There-
fore, it is optimal for home ﬁscal policy to play a more active stabilization role. The diﬀerence
in the volatility of the foreign economy’s variables between the two models is negligible, so
that foreign ﬁscal policy remains almost identical in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Result 4 Foreign ﬁscal policy is more aggressive in the cooperative equilibrium compared to
the benchmark model.
In the benchmark model, governments cooperate by choosing parameters in their rules
to maximize a weighted average of home and foreign welfare. However, in the model with
foreign ownership, the variables in the home economy are more volatile and foreign ﬁscal
policy causes bigger spillovers on the small country.34 This is why foreign ﬁscal policy is
more aggressive under ﬁscal cooperation and now contributes to the stabilization of shocks
i nt h eh o m ee c o n o m y .
Result 5 The reaction of foreign monetary policy to inﬂation is smaller under ﬁscal coop-
eration.
32Home ﬁrms producing ﬁnal goods remain locally-owned.
33S e et h ee x p l a n a t i o ni nt h es e c t i o no nt h et r a n s m i s s i o nm e c h a n i s m .
34See the impulse responses in the section on the transmission mechanism.
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ation is reduced. This can be explained by analyzing some impulse responses.35 Contrac-
tionary monetary policy triggers an expansionary foreign ﬁscal policy and reduces foreign
consumption. This consumption reduction is magniﬁed by the expansionary ﬁscal policy.
Under ﬁscal cooperation, the foreign government reacts stronger to monetary actions, thus
making the indirect eﬀect of foreign ﬁscal policy on foreign private consumption larger.
However, the foreign monetary authority chooses its policy parameters to maximize the
foreign households’ utility; and households dislike consumption variability. Therefore, it is
optimal for the foreign central bank not to respond as strongly to inﬂation as under the
non-cooperative ﬁscal game.
Result 6 Both countries are better-oﬀ in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
In the foreign ownership model, home households do not receive state-contingent dividend
income, and their ability to insure themselves is reduced. Most of the variables in the smaller
country become more volatile (private consumption, GDP). Therefore, both governments
are more active in stabilizing the smaller economy when they cooperate and the government
purchases in both countries are more volatile.
The foreign ﬁscal rule is successful in stabilizing GDP in the large economy, but intro-
duces excessive volatility into foreign private consumption when governments cooperate ﬁscal
policies. The non-tradable private consumption becomes more volatile because government
consumption, which is on non-tradable goods, is more volatile. Foreign tradable private
consumption is also more volatile under ﬁscal cooperation. More volatility comes from the
foreign technology shock in the non-tradable sector. This is not surprising since under ﬁs-
cal cooperation, the weight shifts to stabilizing shocks which aﬀect both countries.36 The
foreign non-tradable technology shock increases volatility of foreign inputs and consequently
35S e eF i g u r e5 .
36The foreign technology shock in the non-tradable sector does not aﬀect quantities in the home economy.
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consumption is more volatile.37 The foreign central bank cushions the eﬀect of more volatile
foreign government purchases on foreign private consumption. However, higher volatility of
government purchases has a dominant eﬀect on foreign private consumption. Private con-
sumption is by far the most important component of welfare, and therefore foreign households
are worse oﬀ under ﬁscal cooperation.
The interaction between ﬁscal policy and private consumption in the home economy
is qualitatively the same as in the foreign country. More volatile government purchases
translate into more volatile non-tradable private consumption. By contrast, home tradable
private consumption is less volatile under ﬁscal cooperation. Most of home tradable private
consumption is on foreign goods and the production of those goods is more volatile. However,
there is a key diﬀerence between foreign and home prices. Less volatility in home prices
translates into less volatility of quantities consumed. Another factor which determines the
volatility of home private consumption is the foreign central bank, which chooses its policy
parameters to maximize foreign welfare. Nonetheless, the foreign central bank has a positive
eﬀect on home private consumption (for the same reason as in the foreign economy). The
overall eﬀect of ﬁscal cooperation on home private consumption is positive but the reduction
in volatility is very small. This small welfare-improving eﬀect is not enough to counterbalance
more volatility in the labor supply and government purchases, therefore, home households
are worse-oﬀ under ﬁscal cooperation.
37Recall that most of ﬁnal tradable consumption is on foreign goods.
Also, increased volatility in foreign non-tradable consumption does not come from the foreign non-tradable
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6.2.1 The elasticity of the intertemporal substitution of government purchases
The estimates of the inverse of the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution of government
consumption, σg, are not readily available. I assume the logarithmic utility of government
purchases in the benchmark calibration, which implies a weight of 0.5 on government pur-
chases in the welfare function.38 I reduce this weight to 0.3, which implies the relative weight
of 0.2 on government purchases compared to private consumption. As a consequence, the
stabilization role of home government is increased but foreign policies are very similar to
the case of logarithmic preferences over government consumption. Both countries are still
better-oﬀ in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
6.2.2 The weights in the joint welfare function
The question of weights in the joint welfare function is a political one, and one could object
to almost any selection of the weights. The literature on ﬁscal cooperation usually assumes
that the weights in the joint welfare function are equal to the relative sizes of the countries.
The results reported above follow such a speciﬁcation. However, I conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the weights, and ﬁnd that qualitative results do not change if the
two countries have equal weight in the joint welfare function.
6.2.3 All policymakers cooperate
The model I use incorporates some realistic assumption about the conduct of economic
policy in the European Union. I assume that the new EU members already participate in
the ERM (by supporting a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t e )a n da r en o ty e tm e m b e r so ft h em o n e t a r y
38The weight on consumption is around 1.5.
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new EU members and the EMU. I also assume that ﬁscal and monetary policies are set in a
non-cooperative fashion which is the case in the EU. Therefore, the results presented above
should not be surprising and are consistent with the literature.
For completeness, I also solve the model in which all policymakers cooperate on their
policies.39 It is interesting that a cooperation among the three “active” players, namely the
two governments and the foreign central bank, is not enough to make both countries better
oﬀ compared to the non-cooperative solution and the solution where only the governments
cooperate. However, both countries are better oﬀ when all four policymakers cooperate. In
this case, I assume that the home central bank conducts a stabilization policy and follows
an interest rate rule similar to that of the foreign central bank.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I study how ﬁscal policies should be conducted in the enlarged EU. I ﬁnd that
there is room for ﬁscal stabilization, but no need for the national governments of the new
EU members and the EMU members to cooperate on their ﬁscal policies. In fact, ﬁscal
cooperation is welfare-reducing for both groups of countries. An important factor which
contributes to this result is the high degree of foreign ownership in the new EU members.
When there is no foreign ownership in the new EU members, EMU is indiﬀerent between
cooperating and not cooperating, but the new EU members still prefer not to cooperate on
ﬁscal policy with EMU.
In this paper I assume that the two countries have national monetary policies. In the
future, the new EU countries will have to join EMU. It would thus be of interest to analyze
the need for ﬁscal cooperation between the two groups of countries considered in this paper
when they constitute a monetary union. In this case, a single central bank would have
39Such a speciﬁcation is not close to the current arrangement in the EU/EMU.
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extension for future research.
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As opposed to home households, foreign consumers buy and trade equity shares in home and
foreign intermediate sector ﬁrms and do not hold home bonds. B∗
∗ denotes foreign bonds
held by foreign consumers, Sx∗
∗,t are shares in foreign ﬁrm x∗ held by a foreign consumer
entering period t and Sx
∗,t are shares in home ﬁrm x held by a foreign consumer entering
period t. The price of shares of foreign ﬁrm x∗ is denoted by V x∗
t and the price of shares of
home ﬁrm x is denoted by V x
t . Foreign households receive dividends on foreign and home
shares, Dx∗
t and Dx
t , respectively. They pay the dividend tax at the rate of τD
t and τD∗
t .














































Working Paper Series No 655
July 2006Table 2: Foreign Share of Equity Market Capitalization in CEEC
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Share in percent
Slovenia - 8.86 7.98 7.77 10.511 9.68 6.01
Estonia 31.50 64.00 72.30 76.70 75.80 79.30 80.88
Hungary 68.30 - 79.20 70.70 - - -
Latvia - - - - - - 54.00
Sources: Ljubljana Stock Exchange, Tallinn Stock Exchange, Riga Stock Exchange, Lat-
vian Central Depository, Reininger et al. (2001).
Table 3: Assumptions About Stochastic Processes
Standard Deviation Persistence Parameter
Home Foreign Home Foreign
Productivity 0.0200 0.0087 0.9 0.9
Marginal Utility of Consumption 0.0387 0.0224 0.7 0.7
Marginal Disutility of Labor 0.0100 0.0032 0.9 0.9
Preference Shifter 0.0089 0.0032 0.9 0.9
Government/GDP 0.0032 0.00100 . 9 0 . 9
Interest Rate - 0.0032 - -
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July 2006Table 4: Macroeconomic Variability of the Czech Republic and the euro area
Czech Republic Euro Area
Model Historic Model Historic
Standard deviation (in %)
Real GDP 1.87 1.74 1.011 .0*
Consumption 2.23 2.29 1.02 0.8*
Government Expenditure 4.66 2.6* 1.08 0.6*
CPI Inﬂation 2.39 1.08 0.25 0.56
Short-Term Interest Rate 0.36 0.47 0.36 0.98
Employment 0.91 -0 . 6 3 1.16
Exports 2.33 3.9* - 2.4*
Imports 2.144 . 1*-3 . 1*
Real Exchange Rate 3.05 3.1 --
Note: The model’s variables are detrended with the HP ﬁlter. The estimates of historic
standard deviations that are taken from Laxton and Pesenti (2003) are marked by a star.
The rest of the estimates for the Czech Republic are taken from Natalucci and Ravenna
(2003) and for the euro area they are taken from Fagan et al. (2005). Data in Laxton and
Pesenti (2003) are detrended with the HP ﬁlter using the smoothness parameter of 1600.
T h et i m ep e r i o df o rt h ee u r oa r e ad a t ai sf r o m1970Q1 to 2002Q4 and for the Czech Republic
from 1973Q1 to 2002Q4. In Natalucci and Ravenna (2003) all series are logged (except for
interest and inﬂation rates) and HP ﬁltered. Data are per capita and seasonally adjusted.
The time span for the Czech Republic is 1994Q1 to 2003Q1. In Fagan et al. (2005), variables
are expressed in per capita terms and logged (except for inﬂation and interest rates). They
are seasonally adjusted and HP ﬁltered.
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July 2006Table 5: Macroeconomic Variability in the Model with and without Foreign Ownership
Czech Republic Euro Area
Foreign Local Foreign Local
Standard deviation (in %)
Real GDP 1.87 1.64 1.011 .01
Consumption 2.23 1.95 1.02 1.02
Government Expenditure 4.66 3.96 1.08 1.08
CPI Inﬂation 2.39 2.23 0.25 0.25
Short-Term Interest Rate 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
Employment 0.91 0.97 0.63 0.63
Exports 2.33 2.21 --
Imports 2.142 . 2 7 - -
Real Exchange Rate 3.05 2.88 - -
Note: ”Foreign” refers to the model with the foreign ownership of intermediate sector
ﬁrms in the home economy. ”Local” refers to the model in which all ﬁrms are locally-owned,
i.e. there is no foreign ownership of ﬁrms in the home economy.
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July 2006Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Foreign Variables to Foreign Intermediate Technology Shock
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July 2006Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Home Variables to Foreign Technology Shock
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July 2006Figure 5: Explaining Why Monetary Policy is Looser Under Fiscal Cooperation
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